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OVERVIEW OF RECENT FIFTH CIRCUIr JURISDICTIONAL DECISIONS
Robert N. Markle*
During the past year, the Fifth Circuit has had a number of opportunities to
address its jurisdiction. This article provides an overview of the myriad of juris-
dictional predicaments in which litigants have become ensnared.
I. ERISA PREEMPTION
A. The Federal Court s Authority to Review a Remand Order
Based on § 144 7(c) Grounds
1. Smith v. Texas Children s Hospital
One especially fertile area for jurisdictional disputes occurs when a defendant
removes' a case from state to federal court, the plaintiff moves to remand' the
case to state court, the district court grants the motion, and the unhappy defen-
dant seeks review of that ruling in the federal court of appeals. The Fifth Circuit
in Smith v. Texas Children 's Hospita3 faced just such a challenge.
In Texas Children "s Hospital, Smith filed suit in Texas state court, alleging
entitlement to long-term disability benefits under various state law causes of
action.' Invoking federal question jurisdiction,' the Hospital removed the action
to federal court on the grounds that the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 ("ERISA"),6 as amended, completely preempted all of Smith's
claims." Subsequently, the Hospital moved for summary judgment, arguing that
ERISA preempted all of Smith's state law claims because they related to a quali-
fied employee benefit plan.8 Smith amended her complaint, deleting her previ-
ous state law claims and adding the claims of estoppel and denial of benefits
under ERISA.9
The district court granted the Hospital's motion for summary judgment as to
the estoppel and ERISA claims.'" The court found that a fraudulent inducement
claim could exist that was not preempted. As a result, the court remanded that
claim to state court." The Hospital appealed the remand order on the grounds
that when Smith amended her complaint, she failed to preserve a state law fraud-
*Robert N. Markle is a Partner in the Appellate Practice Group of Adams and Reese LLP in New Orleans,
Louisiana. Limiting his practice to federal and state appellate litigation, Mr. Markle received a J.D. in 1986
from the University of Connecticut School of Law and a B.A. in 1976 from the University of Connecticut. He is
licensed to practice in Louisiana, Connecticut, and the District of Columbia.
I. The general removal statutes are found at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446 (1994).
2. Remands are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) and (d) (1994).
3. 172 F3d 923 (5th Cir. 1999).
4. See id. at 924 n.1.
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
7. Texas Children s Hasp., 172 E 3d at 924.
8. Section 514(a) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 144(a), provides that "the provisions of this ubchapter... shall super-
sede ... all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate oany [qualified] employee benefit plan ......
9. Texas Children s Hosp., 172 F.3d at 924.
10. Id. at 925.
II. Id.
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ulent inducement claim.12 The Hospital also argued that ERISA would preempt
such a claim even if Smith had preserved it.'3 The Fifth Circuit remanded the
case to the district court with instructions to consider whether Smith had pre-
served a fraudulent inducement claim that survived ERISA preemption."
Following that remand, Smith once again amended her complaint to include
claims of fraudulent inducement and misrepresentation."5 The Hospital again
moved for summary judgment, arguing that ERISA preempted the state law
claims." At that point, the district court remanded the case to state court noting
that it lacked jurisdiction over Smith's claim and that it was remanding pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)." Once again, the Hospital appealed.
1 8
Noting that it was obliged to examine the basis for its jurisdiction sua sponte if
necessary," the Fifth Circuit first discussed the district court's decision to
remand under § 1447(c).2" Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), a district court's order
remanding a case to the state court from which it was removed is not reviewable
on appeal or otherwise." Citing Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer2
the Fifth Circuit explained that it is an established rule that § 1447(d) "prohibits
review of all remand orders issued under [§] 1447(c) whether erroneous or not."23
Further, the two provisions must be construed in pari materia; therefore, only
remand orders issued under § 1447(c) and the grounds invoking specified therein
are immune from review under § 1447(d).2'
When a district court orders a remand under § 1447(c), the order is not review-
able even if the court erroneously concluded that it lacked jurisdiction.25
Acknowledging that the rule appears harsh, the court nonetheless emphasized
that Congress immunized from all forms of review every remand order issued on
§ 1447(c) grounds. 6 In its balancing of competing interests, the court favored
judicial economy. Consequently, the court opined that a district court "is the
final arbiter of whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case."27 Based on the fore-
going, the Fifth Circuit held that it was barred by § 1447(d) from reviewing the
remand order. 8
In so holding, the court rejected the Hospital's argument that the remand order
should be reviewable on appeal because the district court lacked authority to
review the issue of subject matter jurisdiction upon receiving the case earlier
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. ld. See Smith v. Texas Children's Hosp., 84 E3d 152, 153, 157 (5th Cir. 1996).
15. Texas Children s Hospital, 172 F.3d at 924.
16. Id.
17. Section 1447(c) provides that if at any time before final judgment it appears the district court lacks sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, the district court shall remand the case.
18. Texas Children s Hospital, 172 F.3d at 925.
19. Id. (citing Williams v. Chater, 87 F3d 702, 704 (5th Cir. 1996)).
20. Texas Children " Hospital, 172 F.3d at 925.
21. Id.
22. 423 U.S. 336, 343 (1976).
23. See Texas Children ' Hosp., 172 F3d at 925.
24. See id.
25. See id. (citing Gravitt v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 430 U.S. 723, 723-24 (1977)).
26. Texas Children ' Hospital, 172 F.3d at 925.
27. Id. (citing Soley v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 923 F.2d 406,408 (5th Cir. 1991)).
28. Texas Children s Hospital, 172 F.3d at 926.
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from the Fifth Circuit." The Hospital urged that the Fifth Circuit's prior opinion
bound the district court as the law of the case." According to the Hospital, the
district court had no authority to reconsider whether it had subject matter juris-
diction;3' the court reiterated, however, that even if it assumed the district court
erred in reconsidering the issue, § 1447(d) nonetheless precluded the review of a
remand ordered under § 1447(c).3 2
The Hospital also argued that the court should review the remand order
because the Hospital could be substantially prejudiced if substantive rulings by
the district court were viewed as binding on the Hospital in subsequent state
court proceedings.' Deeming this argument meritless, the court explained that
because the district court remanded the case for lack of jurisdiction, the district
court's rulings have no preclusive effect on the state court's consideration of the
Hospital's substantive preemption defense.3
The Hospital also urged the court to review the substantive ruling found in the
district court's remand order.35 According to the Hospital, because the substantive
ruling preceded the district court's conclusion that it lacked subject matter juris-
diction, the ruling therefore constituted a non-section 1447(c) rationale for
remand.36 Consequently, the order should be subject to appellate review.
37
Noting that it had previously rejected the approach that looks beyond the lan-
guage of the remand order to all the surrounding circumstances when determin-
ing whether the order was based on a substantive decision on the merits, the
court explained that it would review remand orders only if the district court affir-
matively stated a non-section 1447(c) ground for remand.' In this case, the dis-
trict court had not done so;9 therefore, the court concluded that it was precluded
from reviewing the remand order and dismissed the appeal.'0
2. Copling v. Container Store, Inc.
Within days of issuing its opinion in Texas Children 's Hospital, a different
panel of the court dismissed an ERISA preemption-based appeal. The plaintiff
in Copling v. Container Store, Inc." was an employee of the defendant. The
employer provided employees and their dependents with medical benefits, one of
which included a "flexible benefit" that allowed employees to deduct pretax dol-
lars from their paycheck to cover eligible medical expenses.42 The deducted









38. See id. at 926-27.
39. Id. at 927.
40. See id.
41. 174 E3d 590 (Sth Cir. 1999).
42. Id. at 593.
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funds were placed in a healthcare reimbursement account from which the
employee drew funds for eligible expenses. 3 Federal tax regulations required
that any unused funds remaining in the account at the end of the plan year were
forfeited."
Copling told the employer that he planned to have some dental work per-
formed." The employer alleged that Copling entered into a flexible benefit plan
providing for the employer to deduct some $1,500 from his salary to fund unre-
imbursed medical and dental expenses.' 8 Copling signed a form authorizing
these deductions and providing that any contributions not used during the plan
year would be forfeited.' Copling received $300 from the plan."
Copling argued that he was not informed that any unused funds would be for-
feited. 9 Copling stated that he thought he was getting a simple payroll deduction
to fund unreimbursed medical expenses but the employer gave him an ERISA
health care reimbursement account instead.' The employer insisted that Copling
forfeited the remainder of the money under the plan's terms."'
Copling filed a breach of contract action in state court.5 2 The employer
removed the case to federal court and moved for summary judgment." The dis-
trict court granted Copling's motion to remand,5 and the employer appealed. 5
The Fifth Circuit distinguished between the two types of preemption under
ERISA.5 First, ERISA may occupy a particular field. 7 This results in complete
preemption 8 under § 502(a) of the Act. 9 According to the court, complete pre-
emption functions as an exception to the well-pleaded complaint ruler" on the
theory that "Congress may so completely pre-empt a particular area that any civil
complaint raising this select group of claims is necessarily federal in character."'
The court further stated that "[section] 502, by providing a civil enforcement
cause of action, completely preempts any state cause of action seeking the same





47. Id. at 593.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 593-94.








59. 29 U.S.C. § I132(a) (1994).
60. The well-pleaded complaint rule states that a suit arises under the Constitution and laws of the United
States only when the plaintiff's statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon those laws or
the Constitution. The Supreme Court explained the rule in Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley, 211
U.S. 149, 152-54 (1908).
61. Copling, 174 F3d at 594 (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1987)).
62. Id.
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Because such a claim presents a federal question, it provides grounds for a fed-
eral court's exercise of jurisdiction on removal from a state court." On a motion
to remand, all the defendant must do to prevent remand is demonstrate a substan-
tial federal claim, e.g., one completely preempted by ERISA." Once the court
has proper removal jurisdiction over a federal claim it may exercise supplemental
jurisdiction 5 over state claims even if it dismisses or otherwise disposes of the
federal claim or claims."
The court determined that this case involved the second type of preemption
known as conflict preemption." Conflict preemption is referred to as ordinary
preemption under § 514.1 The court explained that state law claims falling out-
side the scope of ERISA's civil enforcement provision, even if preempted by §
514(a), are nonetheless governed by the well-pleaded complaint rule and there-
fore are not removable under complete preemption principles.6 9 Conflict pre-
emption, rather than "transmogrifying a state cause of action into a federal one,
as occurs with complete preemption,"7 serves as a defense to a state claim. 1 It
simply fails to establish federal question jurisdiction."
When a complaint raises state causes of action that are completely preempted,
a federal court may exercise removal jurisdiction.3 A complaint containing con-
flict preempted state causes of action must be remanded for want of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction. If a complaint raises both completely preempted claims and
arguably conflict preempted claims, a district court may exercise removal juris-
diction over the completely preempted claims and supplemental jurisdiction over
the remaining claims.7 5
The employer in Copling contended that only conflict preemption existed.76
Because conflict preemption does not function as an exception to the well-plead-
ed complaint rule, the court determined that the district court had no federal
claims before it at any time." Thus, the district court never had subject matter
jurisdiction and was obligated to remand to state court.78 While the court cor-
rectly issued the remand order, it previously commented that ERISA conflict pre-
empted none of the claims.79
In response, the employer argued that the § 1447(d) bar on reviewing § 1447(c)
remand orders did not prevent the Fifth Circuit from reviewing the order." The
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994).
66. Copling, 74 E3d at 594.
67. Id. at 595.
68. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1994).








77. Id. at 595-96.
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employer urged that the court could review the merits as separable from, and col-
lateral to, the remand."1
The court did not agree. 2 It held that the "rejection of an ERISA preemption
defense does not 'in logic and in fact' precede a remand order because, under the
'well-pleaded complaint rule,' a defense does not confer removal jurisdiction."83
The court held that "if the district court considered the preemption defense, it did
so only because of an erroneous belief that the defense was relevant to the juris-
dictional issue."" The court found that the discussion of ERISA conflict pre-
emption was a separable, appealable order.8" Because the district court remanded
under § 1447(c), the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction under §
1447(d).8
I. IMMIGRATION LAW
A. Alvidres-Reys v. Reno
The plaintiffs in Alvidres-Reyes v. Reno87 were fifty resident illegal aliens, who
brought suit for mandamus, declaratory, and injunctive relief." They sought to
compel the Attorney General and the Immigration and Naturalization Service
("INS") to consider their applications for suspension of deportation under a
since-repealed provision of the Immigration and Naturalization Act ("INA")
rather than the more onerous criteria imposed by the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA").'
The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.9" The Fifth Circuit agreed with this determination,
but concluded that a more fundamental reason that the plaintiffs' cause could not
be heard was the federal courts' lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 1
The district court had not ruled on the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. 2 The Fifth Circuit held that the exclusive jurisdiction
provision of IIRIRA93 applies retroactively to deprive courts of jurisdiction to
hear any cause by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by





85. id. at 597.
86. See id.
87. 180 F3d 199 (5th Cir. 1999).
88. Id. at 201.
89. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 309-546).
90. Alvidres-Reyes, 180 F.3d at 201 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 12(bX6)).
91. Alvidres-Reyes, 180 F3d at 20 1.
92. Id.
93. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (1994) states that:
[e]xcept as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall
have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or
action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal
orders against any alien under this Act.
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deportation orders. This exclusive jurisdiction is subject only to exceptions not
applicable to the case before the court."
While the plaintiffs did not explicitly request the district court to order the
defendant to initiate proceedings or adjudicate their deportability, the suit, if suc-
cessful, would compel the defendant to do so in order to consider their applica-
tions for suspension of deportation."' Thus, the suit necessarily called for judi-
cial intervention to reverse the Attorney General's exercise of her discretion not
to commence proceedings against the plaintiffs and not to adjudicate their depor-
tations, which necessarily was included within her refusal to entertain their appli-
cations for suspension of deportations. 6 Relying on Reno v. American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Committee,97 the court held that § 1252(g) of the INA
applied retroactively, even to pending cases. 98 As a result, the court vacated the
district court's judgment and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.9
B. Zadvydas v. Underdown
Shortly after deciding Alvidres-Reyes, the court again encountered the jurisdic-
tional question posed by § 1252(g). This time, however, in Zadvydas v.
Underdown,"'0 the court concluded that it did have jurisdiction."0 ' In this case,
Zadvydas immigrated to the United States in 1956 but, despite his long resi-
dence, never became a citizen."0 2 He did, however, succeed in compiling a
lengthy criminal record, including convictions for attempted robbery and
attempted burglary.'0 3 On these convictions, the INS based its 1977 decision to
deport Zadvydas."'0 While those proceedings were pending, Zadvydas was
released into the community.'05
In 1982, following a lengthy delay, the INS denied Zadvydas's motion for relief
from deportation.' 8 Facing a hearing before an immigration judge that year,
Zadvydas vanished." During the next decade, the INS failed to locate him.0 In
1992, he voluntarily surrendered to authorities and was tried on an outstanding
drug charge, convicted and sentenced to sixteen years imprisonment.'" After
serving only two years, Zadvydas was released on parole. The INS subsequently
took him into custody, reinitiating the deportation proceedings.'7 0
94. Alvidres-Reyes, 180 F.3d at 201.
95. Id. at 205.
96. Id.
97. 525 U.S. 471,487 (1999).
98. See AIvidres-Reyes, 180 E3d at 206.
99. See id.
100. 185 F3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999).
101. Id. at 286.
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For the next three years, Zadvydas was held in custody pending his deporta-
tion."' The INS found itself in a quandary, as neither Germany nor Lithuania
would accept Zadvydas as a citizen. "' Zadvydas filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus,"3 arguing that his continued detention violated his constitutional
rights."'
The district court agreed, holding that continued detention was unconstitution-
al." '5 While the court rejected all challenges to the deportation order and ruled
that his continued detention was authorized by statute, it nonetheless concluded
that "Zadvydas was 'stateless' and thus could 'never be deported because there
[was] no place to send him.' ' ' 1 6 Granting the writ, the court held Zadvydas could
not be permanently incarcerated and that as a practical matter, even though the
INS had in place procedures for review, there was "no end in sight" for
Zadvydas' detention. This violated his substantive due process rights." 7
The INS, which had challenged the district court's jurisdiction in that court,
appealed. " 8 The INS argued that under Gisbert v. United States Attorney
General,"' the long-term detention of excludable aliens pending deportation was
allowable. 2 ' It did not, however, re-urge that challenge before the Fifth
Circuit.'2'
As a threshold matter, the Fifth Circuit addressed the question of its jurisdic-
tion. "'22 The court first explained that Congress plainly indicated its desire to
minimize judicial intrusion into deportation decisions, as evidenced by enact-
ment of IIRIRA."23 As in Alvidres-Reyes, the court relied on Reno v. American-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee. 2"' In Reno, the Supreme Court held that
the enactment was not a general bar, but rather, that it limited judicial review of a
narrow class of discretionary executive actions. 2 The statute immunized from
review actions to "execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter.'"'"
In concluding that jurisdiction existed, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the
Seventh Circuit case, Parra v. Perryman.'27 The Seventh Circuit held in Parra
that the IRIRA provisions did not remove the courts' jurisdiction to hear a §
2241 habeas petition challenging the validity of the statutes authorizing the
detention of aliens. 2 The court held that "the detention, while intimately related
Ill. Id.
112. Id.
113. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994).
114. Zadvydas, 185 F3d at 283.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. See Zadvydas v. Caplinger, 986 F Supp. 1011, 1027 (E.D. La. 1997).
118. Zadvydas, 185 F.3d at 284.
119. 988 F.2d 1437, 1448 (5th Cir. 1993).




124. Id. (citing Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999)).
125. Zadvydas, 185 F3d at 285.
126. Id.
127. 172 E3d 954 (7th Cir. 1999).
128. Zadvydas, 185 F3d at 285.
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to efforts to deport, was not itself a decision to 'execute removal orders' and thus
did not implicate [§] 1252(g) under Reno."
' 129
Upon resolving the jurisdictional issue, the court reversed the district court's
judgment.13 The court held that the government may detain a resident alien
based on either danger to the community or risk of flight,13 ' but a good faith
effort to effectuate the alien's deportation must continue and reasonable parole
and periodic review procedures must remain in place.'
32
III. ABSTENTION
More recently, the Fifth Circuit confronted a jurisdictional question in Weekly
v. Morrow.'33 The district court abstained from deciding Weekly under the
Younger doctrine."' 4 The Younger doctrine reflects a court's prudential decision
not to exercise equity jurisdiction even though it possesses that jurisdiction.'35 In
Weekly, the plaintiff filed a disputed worker's compensation claim with the
Louisiana Office of Workers' Compensation.13 Defendant Morrow was the
administrative hearing officer assigned to Weekly's case.' 3'
Louisiana law entitles employers to an offset in workers' compensation pay-
ments for certain types of Social Security benefits received by an injured
employee."3 Weekly's employer sought discovery of Weekly's Social Security
records.'35 Weekly objected, 40 asserting that he had a privacy interest in his
Social Security records and, under federal law, could not be compelled to dis-
close them."' Morrow disagreed and ordered Weekly to sign a form consenting
to the disclosure of the records."3
Weekly appealed Morrow's ruling to the Louisiana Court of Appeal, which
found no error."3 He then applied to the Supreme Court of Louisiana for discre-
tionary relief.1 ' When the court denied Weekly's application, Weekly petitioned
the Supreme Court of the United States-with similar results. '
Subsequently, Weekly filed an action in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Louisiana seeking to enjoin Morrow from taking steps to
enforce her disclosure order.' 5 Weekly specifically sought to enjoin Morrow
from applying to a Louisiana district court for a contempt citation."' Weekly had
129. Id. (quoting Parra, 172 F3d at 957).
130. Zadvydas, 185 E3d at 297.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 297.
133. 204 F.3d 613 (5th Cir. 2000).
134. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); See also infra, note 150 text accompanying.
135. Weekly, 204 F3d at 614-15.
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characterized his federal suit as one arising under the laws of the United States,"
and as such, one cognizable under the district court's federal question jurisdic-
tion."9 The district court dismissed Weekly's claim on grounds of Younger
abstention. '
On appeal, Weekly challenged the propriety of the district court's decision to
abstain. 5' Prior to oral argument, however, the Fifth Circuit requested supple-
mental briefing on whether, quite apart from the abstention issue, the court pos-
sessed jurisdiction over the case.' 2
In its opinion, the Fifth Circuit explained that no statute grants federal district
courts jurisdiction to hear appeals from state court decisions." While final deci-
sions of the states' highest courts may be reviewed by the Supreme Court on cer-
tiorari,'54 no parallel provision exists granting appellate jurisdiction over state
court decisions to either the federal district courts or the federal courts of
appeals.5 5 In fact, the Supreme Court established under the Rooker-Feldman'"
doctrine that "'federal district courts, as courts of original jurisdiction, lack
appellate jurisdiction to review, modify, or nullify final orders of state courts.'
157
Weekly, according to the Fifth Circuit, came to federal court seeking precisely
such relief.'6 The court concluded that "the district court did not have jurisdic-
tion to hear Weekly's claim, even to the preliminary stage of considering pruden-
tial abstention under Younger."'5 9 Thus, dismissal was proper, but for lack of
jurisdiction." On those grounds only, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court's judgment.'
IV HABEAS CORPUS
Another case illustrating the courts of appeals' ongoing duty to question the
existence of jurisdiction is United States v. Key.'62 Defendant Key pled guilty to
second degree murder committed on federal property and was sentenced to a
prison term of forty years.' 3 Five years later, he filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus." The district court denied the petition. A year later, the Fifth
Circuit denied Key a certificate of appealability. 5
148. Specifically, he premised the suit on 42 U.S.C. § 1306(a) (1994), which governs the disclosure of infor-
mation in the possession of the Social Security Administration.
149. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
150. Id. The Younger doctrine reflects a court's prudential decision not to exercise equity jurisdiction even




154. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1994).
155. Weekly, 204 F3d at 615.
156. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
157. Weekly, 204 F.3d at 615. (quoting Liedtke v. State Bar of Texas, 18 E3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 906 (1994)).
158. Weekly, 204 F.3d at 615.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 615-16.
161. ld. at616.
162. 205 F3d 773 (5th Cir. 2000).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 774.
165. Id.
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The following year, Key sent the district judge a letter asking that counsel be
appointed to assist him in filing a future petition for post-conviction relief.""8
The district court construed the letter as a motion for the appointment of counsel
and denied it. Key appealed that denial. 187
The government did not raise lack of jurisdiction as an issue, but the Fifth
Circuit addressed it sua sponte.'" The court stated that "'every federal appellate
court has a special obligation to satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but
also that of the lower courts in a cause under review, even though the parties are
prepared to concede it.""'  If a district court lacked jurisdiction, the jurisdiction
of the court of appeals "'extends not to the merits but merely for the purpose of
correcting the error of the lower court in entertaining the suit.""
Here, the Fifth Circuit found that the district court lacked jurisdiction over
Key's motion. 7' Because Key had previously filed a federal habeas petition, he
needed the Fifth Circuit's permission before challenging his conviction or sen-
tence in the district court.' 2 If he filed a second habeas petition in the district
court, it would immediately be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because §
2244(b)(3)(A) acts as a bar to the district court's assertion of jurisdiction over
any successive habeas petition until the court of appeals grants the petitioner per-
mission to file one.'
3
The Fifth Circuit concluded that when a statute removes jurisdiction over a par-
ticular type of case from the district courts, it must by necessity also remove
from the district courts' consideration motions for the appointment of counsel to
file the particular claims over which the district courts lack jurisdiction.' Thus
in Key, the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Key's motion for the
appointment of counsel. 7 ' Because the district court was without the power to
rule on the motion, the Fifth Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court
and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.'78
V AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY
In Simon v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,77 the Fifth Circuit demonstrated that a lack
of jurisdiction must be noticed even when a verdict has been handed down.' 8 In
Simon, the plaintiff suffered injuries as a result of a purse-snatching incident in




169. Id. (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 95 (1998)).
170. Key, 205 F.3d at 774 (quoting New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deshotel, 142 F3d 873, 882 (5th Cir. 1998)).
171. Key, 205 F.3d at 774.
172. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) (1994) ("Before a second or successive application permitted by this sec-
tion is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order autho-
rizing the district court to consider the application.")
173. Id. See Hooker v. Sivley, 187 F3d 680, 681-82 (5th Cir. 1999).
174. Key, 205 F3d at 775.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. 193 F3d 848 (5th Cir. 1999).
178. Id. at 851-52.
179. Id. at 849.
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plaintiff filed suit against Wal-Mart in Louisiana state court, asserting that she
"suffered bodily injuries and damages including but not limited to a severely
injured shoulder, soft-tissue injuries throughout her body, bruises, abrasions and
other injuries to be shown more fully at trial, and has incurred or will incur med-
ical expenses."'" In accordance with Louisiana law, 8' she did not plead a specif-
ic monetary amount of damages.'82
Wal-Mart removed the case to federal court" invoking diversity jurisdiction.'
Neither the district court nor either of the parties questioned the court's jurisdic-
tion, and the case proceeded to trial. 8 The district court entered judgment on a
$30,000 jury verdict for Simon, and Wal-Mart appealed.188
The Fifth Circuit did not reach the merits of the case because it concluded that
the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 87 While the citizenship of the
parties was completely diverse, Wal-Mart failed to meet its burden of proof that
the amount in controversy exceeded the statutory minimum of $75,000.'
The court found that a defendant who removes a case from a Louisiana state
court--or from the state courts of any other state that prohibits a specific mone-
tary demand in the pleadings-may make this showing in one of two ways."*
First, the defendant may demonstrate that it is "facially apparent" that the claims
are likely above $75,000. '0 Second, a defendant may set forth facts in controver-
sy-preferably in the notice of removal-that support a finding of the requisite
amount.' 91
The court observed that Wal-Mart neither filed an affidavit with its notice of
removal nor set forth any facts in controversy in that notice.'92 Wal-Mart alleged
in a conclusory manner that the amount in controversy exceeded the jurisdiction-
al amount.'93 Accordingly, removal was proper "only if the jurisdictional amount
was 'facially apparent' from the complaint."'
94
Unlike Simon, the court in Luckett concluded that the jurisdictional amount of
damages was apparent on the face of the complaint. 9 In Luckett, the plaintiff
sued an airline for the loss of her luggage that contained her heart medication.
96
She became severely ill after missing her medication. In her complaint, the
plaintiff alleged damages involving actual property damage, lost travel expenses,
an emergency ambulance trip, a six-day hospital stay, pain and suffering, humili-
ation, and temporary inability to do housework following her hospitalization.'97
180. Id. at 849-50 (quoting from Simon's pleading).
181. See LA. CODE CIv. PRO. ANN. art. 893 (West 1999).
182. Simon, 193 F.3d at 849-50.
183. Id. at 850.
184. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994).
185. Simon, 193 F3d at 850.
186. Id. at 848.
187. Id. at 849.
188. Id. at 850.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. (citing Luckett v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 171 F.3d 295, 298 (5th Cir. 1999)).
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In contrast, the complaint in Simon alleged, with little specificity, damages
from less severe physical injuries-an injured shoulder, bruises, and abrasions-
and unidentified medical expenses.'98 The complaint did not allege damages for
loss of property, emergency transportation, hospital stays, specific types of med-
ical treatment, emotional distress, functional impairments, or disability which, if
alleged, would have supported a substantially larger monetary basis for federal
jurisdiction.'" On the basis of these allegations, the court concluded that it was
not "facially apparent" that the amount of damages would exceed $75,00.200
The court emphasized that it must evaluate the facts supporting jurisdiction as
of the time of removal; therefore, the court may not consider the entire post-
removal record.2"' For example, the court could not consider evidence adduced
at trial or allegations of damages described in the parties' appellate briefs.02
Because Wal-Mart faced a complaint that described damages that were inade-
quate to support removal, it had an affirmative burden to produce information
through factual allegations or an affidavit sufficient to show by a preponderance
of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000.03 Simon's
failure to object to removal or jurisdiction did not relieve Wal-Mart of its burden
to support federal jurisdiction at the time of removal.20' Holding that the district
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit vacated the district
court's judgment, remanded the case to the district court with instructions for it
to remand to the state court from which the case had been removed, and dis-
missed the appeal."'
VI. NOTICE OF APPEAL
The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure require that a notice of appeal speci-
fy the order from which the appeal is taken."° A policy of liberal construction of
notices of appeal prevails when the intent to appeal an unmentioned or misla-
beled ruling is apparent and there is no prejudice to the adverse party."7
A bankruptcy trustee in In re Hensley2" brought an adversarial proceeding
seeking a determination that pre-petition partition agreements executed by the
debtor and his non-debtor wife were void as fraudulent.2" On May 13, 1999, the
district court held the partition void as to the non-debtor wife and entered an
interlocutory judgment restoring the couple's pre-partition community property
interests and passing the debtor-husband's pre-partition interest to the trustee.210
198. Id.






205. Id. at 851-52.
206. See FED. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B) (A notice of appeal must designate the judgment, order, or part thereof
being appealed).
207. See In Re Hensley, 201 E3d 638, 641 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Warfield v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 904
F.2d 322, 325 (5th Cir. 1990)).
208. 201 F.3d at 638.
209. Id. at 641.
210. Id.
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On July 31, the district court issued a supplemental opinion denying both par-
ties' motions to alter and amend the judgment, reiterated the basis for its deci-
sion, and clarified that the wife's pre-partition community interest was "subject
to the community debts and the bankruptcy estate's control."2"' In the interim,
the court entered an order on July 1, granting the trustee's June 29 motion to un-
freeze the wife's brokerage accounts, which contained proceeds of partitioned
property, and to transfer the balance to the trustee.212 On July 2, the wife filed a
notice of appeal from the July 1 order.1 3 The parties did not dispute the statutory
basis for the Fifth Circuit's appellate jurisdiction."' The court was then required
to consider the scope of its jurisdiction. 15 The Fifth Circuit concluded that
because the July 1 order merely allowed execution on the May 13 interlocutory
judgment, and because both parties briefed the substantive issues regarding sum-
mary judgment, the court's jurisdiction extended to the May 13 opinion and judg-
ment." 6
At the same time, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the dis-
trict court's July 31 supplemental opinion and August 2 order. " The court based
this reasoning on the conclusion that the appellant could not have intended to
appeal from an order not yet issued at the time she filed the notice of appeal.1 8
VII. RIPENESS
In an attempt to give meaning to Article III's "case or controversy" require-
ment, courts have developed a series of principles termed "justiciability doc-
trines." One such doctrine that "cluster[s] about Article I1" is ripeness. 19
In United Transportation Union v. Foster,22 the Fifth Circuit had occasion to
address the ripeness of a case for adjudication. The issue presented on appeal
was whether federal law preempted three Louisiana railroad transportation
statutes. 2 ' The defendant, the Governor of Louisiana, signed the three trans-
portation statutes into law.222 One authorized Louisiana law enforcement officers
to administer post-collision toxicological testing to railroad crews involved in
collisions at railroad crossings.2 3 The second statute required that locomotives




214. The court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), which grants appellate jurisdiction over inter-
locutory orders of the district courts granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions.
215. In Re Hensley, 201 F3d at 641.
216. See id. at 642.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F2d 1166, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Bork, J., concurring), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 823 (1983).
220. 205 F.3d 851 (5th Cir. 2000).
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the devices at specified locations 2" ' The third statute required railroad employ-
ees to inform state authorities whether a train involved in an accident at a rail-
road crossing possessed an event recorder.225
The plaintiffs, two unions and a railroad industry association, filed suit in fed-
eral district court seeking pre-enforcement review of the railroad safety laws.2
The plaintiffs alleged that federal law preempted all three statutes and that all
three statutes created an undue burden on interstate commerce. They further
alleged that the first statute violated the Fourth Amendment by allowing a law
enforcement officer who lacks probable cause to administer post-collision toxi-
cological testing to a railroad employee as part of a criminal investigation 2
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.28 In
making its decision, the district court held that the federal law preempted all
three statutes. The court further held that the first statute violated the Fourth
Amendment, and the second statute created an undue burden on interstate com-
merce.
22
The Fifth Circuit, sua sponte, raised the issue of ripeness because of the possi-
ble jurisdictional defect.23 The court stated that "[r]ipeness separates those mat-
ters that are premature because the injury is speculative and may never occur
from those that are appropriate for judicial review.""2 1 Even though a case may
be brought under the federal Declaratory Judgment Act,232 and prior to a com-
pleted "injury-in-fact," such a case must still be limited to the resolution of an
"actual controversy."2  Thus, despite the nature of the action, a court cannot hear
a case unless the suit is ripe for review.
2 3
The court set forth the prevailing standard for determining whether a dispute is
ripe for adjudication:
A court should dismiss a case for lack of "ripeness" when the case is abstract or
hypothetical. The key considerations are "the fitness of the issues for judicial
decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration." A
case is generally ripe if any remaining questions are purely legal ones; converse-
ly, a case is not ripe if further factual development is required. 235
Based on this standard, the court concluded that the plaintiffs' challenge to the
first of the three statutes was "entirely too speculative and hypothetical" to estab-
lish the existence of a "case or controversy." In other words, the challenge was
not ripe for review. '
224. Id. at 855-56.





230. See id. at 857 (citing Lang v. French, 154 F3d 217, 222 (5th Cir. 1998)).
231. Foster, 205 E3d at 857.
232. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994).
233. Foster, 205 E3d at 857.
234. Id. (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-40 (1937)).
235. Foster, 205 F.3d at 857 (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 833 F.2d 583,
586-87 (5th Cir. 1987)).
236. Foster, 205 F.3d at 858.
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The court characterized the plaintiffs' challenge as one that "sits atop a moun-
tain of conjecture and speculation. 2 3 For the statute to run afoul of the Fourth
Amendment, a series of events must necessarily occur." First, a collision must
occur at a Louisiana railroad crossing. Although the law of probability suggests
that such a collision may be inevitable, the court could not determine with any
degree of certainty when such an event would occur.2' It is possible that the
state legislature may amend or repeal the statute before another locomotive colli-
sion at a Louisiana railroad crossing occurs.2"'
Second, even assuming such a collision occurs, the statute does not operate
automatically in the event of a collision."1 Instead, a law enforcement officer
must have "reasonable grounds to believe the person [operated] or [had] physical
control of the locomotive engine while under the influence" of alcohol or other
illegal controlled substances. 2 The court pointed out that many cases will arise
where an officer's suspicion does not rise to the level necessary to trigger the
statute's application. 3
Third, "reasonable grounds to believe" must be interpreted to mean something
other than "probable cause."" ' An officer must order such testing without actu-
ally having "probable cause."2 ' In light of what it deemed "the extreme prema-
turity of [the] action," the court refused to allow the plaintiffs' Fourth
Amendment facial challenge to the statute."
The court next turned to the second and third statutes. 27 The court found that
the second statute imposed immediate obligations on the railroad, including
potential equipment modifications and operating procedures.2" The court held
that the issue was ripe for judicial resolution. 9
The third statute was also ripe for adjudication.25 Its requirements, similar to
those of the first statute, depended upon a future railroad collision.251 Unlike the
first statute, however, the only questions the court needed to decide were purely
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Referring to the federal courts, the Supreme Court made clear early in the his-
tory of the Republic, that the "presumption is (not as with regard to a court of
general jurisdiction, that a cause is within its jurisdiction unless the contrary
appears, but rather) that a cause is without its jurisdiction, until the contrary
appears."2 ' As is apparent from the foregoing cases, the Fifth Circuit views
quite seriously its proper role as an appellate court of limited jurisdiction.
254. Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 10, (1799); see also Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.
Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) ("It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside a federal court's limit-
ed jurisdiction."); Grace v. American Cent. Ins. Co. of St. Louis, 109 U.S. 278, 283 (1883) ("As the jurisdiction
of a federal court is limited, in the sense that it has no other jurisdiction than that conferred by the constitution
and laws of the United States, the presumption is that a cause is without its jurisdiction unless the contrary
affirmatively appears.").

